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D.C. Crim. No. 92-cr-00671-10 
District Judge: The Honorable Lowell A. Reed, Jr. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
I. 
 
In November, 1992, a federal grand jury in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging 
twenty defendants, including Omar McBride, with over 
eighty counts of drug trafficking, violent crime in aid of 
racketeering, and firearms offenses. On June 23, 1993, 
each of the eight defendants who went to trial was 
convicted on one or more counts of the forty counts which 
went to the jury. McBride was convicted for his 
membership in a conspiracy, known as "The Zulu Nation," 
to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute crack 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846. 
 
At sentencing, the District Court attributed a total weight 
of 49.4 kilograms of crack cocaine to the conspiracy and 
27.5 kilograms of that amount to McBride. Accordingly, 
McBride's offense level was set at 42. U.S.S.G.S 2D1.1(c) 
(1993). This offense level was enhanced by two levels for 
McBride's possession of a firearm. S 2D1.1(b)(1). With a 
total offense level thus set at 44 and a criminal history 
category of III, McBride was sentenced to life in prison. We 
affirmed the judgment of sentence in an unpublished 
 
                                2 
  
opinion. United States v. McBride, 74 F.3d 1229 (1995) 
(table). 
 
II. 
 
On September 19, 1997, McBride moved for a reduction 
of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3582(c)(2). The motion 
was based on Amendment 505 to the Sentencing 
Guidelines, an amendment which became effective on 
November 1, 1994 and which, as relevant here, deleted 
offense levels 38, 40, and 42 of the Drug Quantity Table in 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c) and inserted a revised level 38 as the 
upper limit of the Table. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual, App. C, Vol. 1 (1998). The Sentencing Commission 
explained that, absent the extraordinary case, more than 
level 38 is not required to ensure adequate punishment 
given that organizers, leaders, managers, and supervisors 
will receive a four, three, or two level enhancement for their 
role in the offense and a two level enhancement will be 
received by any participant who possessed a dangerous 
weapon in the offense. 
 
In a Memorandum Opinion dated October 26, 2000, the 
District Court agreed that retroactive application of 
Amendment 505 would be available to McBride and that 
the guideline imprisonment range would be recomputed 
after giving him the benefit of the level 38 cap and adding, 
as before, the two level enhancement of possession of a 
firearm. Certainly, then, to the extent that McBride had 
sought consideration of a reduction of sentence under 18 
U.S.C. S 3582(c)(2), his motion was granted. The Court 
scheduled a limited sentencing hearing, ordered an updated 
presentence report, and appointed counsel to represent 
McBride. 
 
On January 5, 2001, the sentence hearing commenced. 
McBride asked that, aside from any benefit he might receive 
as a result of the retroactive amendment, he be resentenced 
in accordance with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), and the hearing was adjourned in order that that 
issue could be briefed. Apprendi, as by now is surely well 
known, held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
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prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 490. As 
argued, and as briefed, McBride's position was that 
Apprendi had by then become "the law of the land" and 
because the jury had not found a specific drug quantity 
beyond a reasonable doubt, he should be resentenced 
within the statutory maximum for 21 U.S.C. S 846, "the 
object of said conspiracy being 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1), 
without regard to quantity." Supp. App. 31. Applying 
Apprendi, he argued, would result in a maximum sentence 
of twenty years under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(C) rather than 
a sentence within the expected guideline imprisonment 
range, as recomputed, of 360 months to life imprisonment. 
 
The District Court determined that even if Apprendi could 
be applied retroactively, it would not be applied at 
McBride's resentencing because that resentencing was 
circumscribed by the nature of the motion before the Court, 
which was simply a motion under 18 U.S.C. S 3582(c)(2) for 
a reduction of sentence based on a change in the 
Guidelines. Accordingly, the Court only gave McBride the 
benefit of that change, pegging the base offense level at 38, 
and resentenced him to 400 months imprisonment. 
 
McBride has appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a) and will affirm. 
 
 III. 
 
McBride's appeal turns on his challenge to the scope of 
the resentencing hearing. He argues that the District Court 
erred in restricting the scope of that hearing to the benefit, 
if any, he would receive by virtue of the retroactive 
amendment to S 2D1.1 with its new upper limit on the base 
offense level. Rather, the argument goes, the scope of the 
hearing should have encompassed Apprendi and the 
substantial benefit the application of Apprendi  would 
assuredly have afforded him. We review de novo the District 
Court's determination to the contrary. United States v. 
Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
McBride moved for a reduction of sentence pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. S 3582(c)(2) seeking relief based upon 
Amendment 505. S (c)(2) provides: 
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       (c) The court may not modify a term of imprisonment 
       once it has been imposed except that -- 
 
       . . . 
 
       (2) in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced 
       to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range 
       that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
       Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o) . . . the 
       court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after 
       considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to 
       the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction 
       is consistent with applicable policy statements issued 
       by the Sentencing Commission. 
 
The Commission's applicable policy statement isS 1B1.10, 
which explicitly makes Amendment 505 retroactive, stating, 
as relevant here: 
 
       Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as a Result of 
       Amended Guideline Range (Policy Statement) 
 
       (a) Where a defendant is serving a term of 
       imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to 
       that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a 
       result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual 
       listed in subsection (c) below, a reduction in the 
       defendant's term of imprisonment is authorized under 
       18 U.S.C. S 2(c)(2). 
 
       . . . 
 
       (c) Amendments covered by this policy statement 
       [include Amendment #]505. . . . 
 
Where a reduction in a term of imprisonment is 
authorized by virtue of an amendment explicitly made 
retroactive, S 1B1.10(b) specifies what a court should 
consider when determining if a reduction is warranted and, 
if so, the extent of that reduction, to wit: 
 
       (b) In determining whether, and to what extent, a 
       reduction in the term of imprisonment is warranted for 
       a defendant eligible for consideration under 18 U.S.C. 
       S 3582(c)(2), the court should consider the term of 
       imprisonment that it would have imposed had the 
       amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) 
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       been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced 
       . . . 
 
The commentary to S 1B1.10 unambiguously emphasizes 
the limited nature of what may be considered: 
 
       In determining the amended guideline range under 
       subsection (b), the court shall substitute only the 
       amendments listed in subsection (c) for the 
       corresponding guideline provisions that were applied 
       when the defendant was sentenced. All other guideline 
       application decisions remain unaffected. 
 
comment. (n.2). It is, thus, clear that only the retroactive 
amendment is to be considered at a resentencing under 
S 3582 and the applicability of that retroactive amendment 
must be determined in light of the circumstances existent 
at the time sentence was originally imposed. In other 
words, the retroactive amendment merely replaces the 
provision it amended and, thereafter, the Guidelines in 
effect at the time of the original sentence are applied. 
 
Wholly aside from the fact that there was no Apprendi at 
the time of the original sentencing, constraining a court's 
consideration to the retroactive amendment at issue is 
consistent with the focused nature of a proceeding under 
S 3582. See United States v. Cothran, 106 F.3d 1560, 1562 
(11th Cir. 1997) (holding that S 3582(c)(2) does not 
contemplate a full de novo resentencing); United States v. 
Torres, 99 F.3d 360, 362-63 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that treating a resentencing under S 3582 as a de novo 
resentencing would negate the limit on retroactivity found 
in S 1B1.10). Indeed, we, too, have distinguished between a 
"full resentencing" and a reduction of sentence under 18 
U.S.C. S 3582(c). United States v. Faulks , 201 F.3d 208, 
210 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
While, of course, Apprendi is being regularly invoked by 
defendants in various settings with varying degrees of 
success, we have not until now decided in a published 
opinion whether it would afford relief when a modification 
of sentence is sought under 18 U.S.C. S 3582(c)(2). See 
United States v. Nixon, No. 01-3128 at 4 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 
2002) (unpub.). We hold that it would not, as have those 
Courts of Appeals that have considered this issue. 
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United States v. Smith, 241 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2001), is 
remarkably similar to the case before us, with the Seventh 
Circuit reaching the same conclusion we reach. Smith filed 
a motion for resentencing under S 3582(c), seeking a 
reduction in sentence based on a retroactive change in the 
Guidelines. The District Court agreed that a reduction was 
appropriate and reduced his sentence from life 
imprisonment to 405 months. But, as the Seventh Circuit 
put it, "Smith was not happy with this change, even though 
it [was] the one specified by the amended guideline." Id. at 
547. Smith asked the District Court to reduce his sentence 
to 240 months because the jury had not determined the 
amount of crack cocaine in which he had dealt and, under 
21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(C), 240 months was the maximum 
sentence which could be imposed. Neither the District 
Court nor the Seventh Circuit was persuaded, but after 
Apprendi was issued, the Supreme Court remanded Smith's 
case to the Seventh Circuit for further consideration. 
 
On remand, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Apprendi 
claim. 
 
       Smith did not raise this issue in 1992, when it would 
       have been possible to submit the question to a jury, so 
       "plain error" would be the standard if this were a direct 
       appeal. But it is not. . . . Smith's post-judgment request 
       for resentencing rested on a change in the Sentencing 
       Guidelines. Only at his resentencing under the 
       amended guideline did Smith first raise the contention 
       that the jury should have been told to determine 
       whether the conspiracy dealt in 50,5, or less than 5, 
       grams of crack cocaine. That was a new issue, one not 
       authorized by S 3582(c), for it is unrelated to any 
       change in the Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
241 F.3d at 548.1 In a case, coincidentally, of the same 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Seventh Circuit described Smith's Apprendi claim as "effectively" 
a collateral attack on his sentence, usually raised by motion under 28 
U.S.C. S 2255. Although the Court discussed the cause and prejudice 
Smith was required to show to obtain collateral relief, and found both 
wanting, it also found it "by no means clear" that Apprendi would apply 
in the first place. Id. at 549. It pointed out that the Supreme Court had 
not held that Apprendi is retroactively applicable on collateral attack. 
We 
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name, the Fourth Circuit, describing a resentencing under 
 
S 3582(c)(2) as "merely a form of limited remand," agreed 
with the Seventh Circuit that an argument that the 
defendant's sentence violated Apprendi was not authorized 
by S 3582(c) because it was unrelated to any change in the 
 
Guidelines. United States v. Smith, No. 00-4181, 2001 WL 
427790 (4th Cir. Apr. 26, 2001). See also United States v. 
Bacote, No. 00-1622, 2001 WL 393705 (2d Cir. Apr. 18, 
 
2001).2 
 
The District Court determined that McBride's Apprendi 
argument was independent of and unrelated to any change 
in the Guidelines and was, therefore, outside the scope of 
a sentence modification under S 3582. Given the limited 
nature of the S 2 proceeding, and given the constraints of 
S 1B1.10, p.s., we agree. 
 
       IV. 
 
The order of the District Court will be affirmed. 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
have held that the new rule in Apprendi was not retroactive to cases on 
collateral review. In re: Turner, 267 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2001). So, too, 
now 
has the Seventh Circuit in a case decided after Smith, United States v. 
Sanders, 247 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2001), as has each Court of Appeals to 
have considered the issue. 
 
2. See also United States v. Paul, Crim. A. 96-049, 2001 WL 883130 
(E.D. La. July 26, 2001) (rejecting Apprendi claim as "clear[ly]" and 
"unambiguous[ly]" inappropriate for consideration under S 3582, based 
on that statute's language); United States v. Griffin, No. CR. A. 93-491, 
2001 WL 540997 (E.D. Pa. May 21, 2001) ("Apprendi challenge may not 
be brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3582(c)(2) because it does not relate 
to a change in the Sentencing Guidelines by the Sentencing 
Commission"); United States v. Morgan, Crim. 92-665-1, 2000 WL 
1368028 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2000) (because "Apprendi did not directly 
address the federal sentencing guideline issues," S 3582 motion was 
inapplicable). 
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